A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive when the Legislature cannot be convened against domestic Violence. Are we becoming a nation of vigilantes? The majority opinion in Corfield v. Coryell , however, gives a different approach, stating that the clause protected only certain "fundamental" rights: " P rotection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.
The majority opinion enumerates a few specific rights such as the right to live in and travel through states, the right to sue in courts, etc , but also notes that this is not a comprehensive list. Corfield became increasingly prominent in later years, particularly in the context of issues like slavery and universal suffrage.
Please help us improve our site! In the Articles of Confederation we have some of these specifically mentioned, and enough perhaps to give some general idea of the class of civil rights meant by the phrase. First, the clause is a guaranty to the citizens of the different states of equal treatment by Congress; in other words, it is a species of equal protection clause binding on the National Government.
Though it received some recognition in the Dred Scott case, particularly in the opinion of Justice Catron, this theory is today obsolete. This theory found some expression in a few state cases and best accords with the natural law-natural rights language of Justice Washington in Corfield v.
If it had been accepted by the Court, this theory might well have endowed the Supreme Court with a reviewing power over restrictive state legislation as broad as that which it later came to exercise under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it was firmly rejected by the Court.
This theory, too, the Court rejected. It is this narrow interpretation that has become the settled one. It relieves them from the disabilities of alien-age in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws.
The recent cases emphasize that interpretation of the clause is tied to maintenance of the Union. Hostile discrimination against all nonresidents infringes the clause, but controversies between a state and its own citizens are not covered by the provision.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause is self-executory, that is to say, its enforcement is dependent upon the judicial process. It does not authorize penal legislation by Congress. Federal statutes prohibiting conspiracies to deprive any person of rights or privileges secured by state laws, or punishing infractions by individuals of the right of citizens to reside peacefully in the several states and to have free ingress into and egress from such states, have been held void.
A question much mooted before the Civil War was whether the term could be held to include free Negroes. In the Dred Scott case, the Court answered it in the negative. The only category of national citizenship added under the Constitution comprised aliens, naturalized in accordance with acts of Congress. It was argued that the Court was bound to look beyond the act of incorporation and see who were the incorporators. If it found these to consist solely of citizens of the incorporating state, it was bound to permit them through the agency of the corporation to exercise in other states such privileges and immunities as the citizens thereof enjoyed.
In Bank of Augusta v. Earle , this view was rejected. This would be to give the citizens of other States far higher and greater privileges than are enjoyed by the citizens of the State itself. Virginia , but by a different course of reasoning. Later recent cases held that this discretion is qualified by other provisions of the Constitution notably the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
The classical judicial exposition of the meaning of this phrase is that of Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell , which was decided by him on circuit in We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union.
The right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus ; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State.
After thus defining broadly the private and personal rights which were protected, Justice Washington went on to distinguish them from the right to a share in the public patrimony of the state.
Virginia ; the logic of Geer v. Connecticut extended the same rule to wild game, and Hudson Water Co. McCarter applied it to the running water of a state. In Toomer v. Witsell , however, the Court refused to apply this rule to free-swimming fish caught in the three-mile belt off the coast of South Carolina.
The virtual demise of the state ownership theory of animals and natural resources compelled the Court to review and revise its mode of analysis of state restrictions that distinguished between residents and nonresidents in respect to hunting and fishing and working with natural resources. A two-pronged test emerged. First, the Court held, it must be determined whether an activity in which a nonresident wishes to engage is within the protection of the clause.
Such activities as the pursuit of common callings within the state, the ownership and disposition of privately held property within the state, and the access to the courts of the state, had been recognized in previous cases as fundamental and protected against unreasonable burdening; but sport and recreational hunting, the issue in the particular case, was not a fundamental activity.
Contrariwise, accessing public records through a state freedom of information act was held not to be a fundamental activity, and a state may limit such access to its own citizens.
An Alaska statute giving residents preference over nonresidents in hiring for work on the oil and gas pipelines within the state failed both elements of the test. Universal practice has also established a political exception to the clause to which the Court has given its approval. Not only has judicial construction of the comity clause excluded certain privileges of a public nature from its protection, but the courts also have established the proposition that the purely private and personal rights to which the clause admittedly extends are not in all cases beyond the reach of state legislation which differentiates citizens and noncitizens.
Broadly speaking, these rights are held subject to the reasonable exercise by a state of its police power, and the Court has recognized that there are cases in which discrimination against nonresidents may be reasonably resorted to by a state in aid of its own public health, safety and welfare.
To that end a state may reserve the right to sell insurance to persons who have resided within the state for a prescribed period of time. Without violating this section, a state may limit the dower rights of a nonresident to lands of which the husband died seized while giving a resident dower in all lands held during the marriage, or may leave the rights of nonresident married persons in respect of property within the state to be governed by the laws of their domicile, rather than by the laws it promulgates for its own residents.
The right to sue and defend in the courts is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship and must be allowed by each state to the citizens of all other states to the same extent that it is allowed to its own citizens. In the exercise of its taxing power, a state may not discriminate substantially between residents and nonresidents. In Ward v. Maryland , the Court set aside a state law that imposed specific taxes upon nonresidents for the privilege of selling within the state goods that were produced in other states.
Also found to be incompatible with the comity clause was a Tennessee license tax, the amount of which was dependent upon whether the person taxed had his chief office within or without the state.
The Court returned to the privileges-and-immunities restrictions upon disparate state taxation of residents and nonresidents in Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal.
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