An analysis of these overall results indicates that there is no need for the credit market to be unduly concerned with the possible effects of Fuentes and Adams; it will affect only a minute portion of the credit markets' transactions. Search DSpace. This Collection. Login Register. The purported waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales contract and a necessary condition of the sale. The appellees made no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights.
Yet, as in Overmyer, there is no need in the present cases to canvass those consequences fully. For a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear. We need not concern ourselves with the involuntariness or unintelligence of a waiver when the contractual language relied upon does not, on its face, even amount to a waiver.
The conditional sales contracts here simply provided that, upon a default, the seller "may take back," "may retake" or "may repossess" merchandise. The contracts. They did not indicate how or through what process -- a final judgment, self-help, prejudgment replevin with a prior hearing, or prejudgment replevin without a prior hearing -- the seller could take back the goods.
Rather, the purported waiver provisions here are no more than a statement of the seller's right to repossession upon occurrence of certain events. The appellees do not suggest that these provisions waived the appellants' right to a full post-seizure hearing to determine whether those events had, in fact, occurred and to consider any other available defenses.
By the same token, the language of the purported waiver provisions did not waive the appellants' constitutional right to a pre-seizure hearing of some kind. We hold that the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin provisions work a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their possessor.
We do not question the power of a State to seize goods before a final judgment in order to protect the security interests of creditors so long as those creditors have tested their claim to the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing. The nature and form of such prior hearings, moreover, are legitimately open to many potential variations, and are a. Burson, supra, at U. Kelly, supra, at U. For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the District Courts are vacated, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cortese et al. See infra at U. Both Mrs. Fuentes and the appellants in No. We do not, however, reach that issue. See n 32, infra. Neither Mrs. Fuentes nor the appellants in No. Compare Younger v. Harris, U. Rather, they challenged only the summary extrajudicial process of prejudgment seizure of property to which they had already been subjected. They invoked the jurisdiction of the federal district courts under 42 U.
Unlike Mrs. Fuentes in No. Since the announcement of this Court's decision in Sniadach v. The summary deprivation of property under statutes very similar to the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes at issue here has been held unconstitutional by at least two courts.
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co. Pitchess, 5 Cal. But see Brunswick Corp. Adams Co. MacMillan, N. Applying Sniadach to other closely related forms of summary prejudgment remedies, some courts have construed that decision as setting forth general principles of procedural due process and have struck down such remedies.
Egley, F. The Viceroy Hotel Corp. McElroy, F. Jones, F. Appellate Dept. Fetherston, 44 Wis. Motor Travel Services Inc. See Lebowitz v. Other courts, however, have construed Sniadach as closely confined to its own facts and have upheld such summary prejudgment remedies. Motor Contract Co. Dick, F. Zimmerman, F. Ridley, F. Superior Court of Maricopa County, Ariz. Department of Buildings, 26 N. Or such person may seek like relief, but with summons to defendant instead of replevy writ in which event no bond is required and the property shall be seized only after judgment, such judgment to be in like form as that provided when defendant has retaken the property on a forthcoming bond.
The basic Pennsylvania statutory provision regarding the issuance of writs of replevin is the following:. The procedural prerequisites to issuance of a prejudgment writ are, however, set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The relevant rules are the following:. If the property is not ordered to be impounded and if no counterbond is filed, the sheriff shall deliver the property to the plaintiff. See n 7, supra. In the case of every appellant in No.
If a complaint is not filed within twenty 20 days after service of the rule, the prothonotary, upon praecipe of the defendant, shall enter a judgment of non pros. None of the appellants in No. See T. Holdsworth, History of English Law ; 2 F. Maitland, History of English Law ; J. Cobbey, Replevin The creditor could, of course, proceed without the use of state power, through self-help, by "distraining" the property before a judgment.
See n 10, supra. They may not even test that much. For if an applicant for the writ knows that he is dealing with an uneducated, uninformed consumer with little access to legal help and little familiarity with legal procedures, there may be a substantial possibility that a summary seizure of property -- however unwarranted -- may go unchallenged, and the applicant may feel that he can act with impunity.
The appellants argue that this opportunity for quick recovery exists only in theory. They allege that very few people in their position are able to obtain a recovery bond, even if they know of the possibility. Appellant Fuentes says that, in her case, she was never told that she could recover the stove and stereo, and that the deputy sheriff seizing them gave them at once to the Firestone agent, rather than holding them for three days.
She further asserts that, of cases of prejudgment replevin in small claims courts in Dade County, Florida, in , there was not one case in which the defendant took advantage of the recovery provision. Bell v. Although not mentioned in the Sniadach opinion, there clearly was a quick-recovery provision in the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute at issue. Sniadach, 37 Wis.
Justice Harlan adverted to the recovery provision in his concurring opinion. These sorts of provisions for recovery of property by posting security are, of course, entirely different from the security requirement upheld in Lindsey v.
Normet, U. There, the Court upheld a requirement that a tenant wanting a continuance of an eviction hearing must post security for accruing rent during the continuance. The tenant did not have to post security in order to remain in possession before a hearing; rather, he had to post security only in order to obtain a continuance of the hearing.
Moreover, the security requirement in Lindsey was not a recovery provision. For the tenant was not deprived of his possessory interest even for one day without opportunity for a hearing.
The possessory interest of Rosa Washington, an appellant in No. Her interest was not protected by contract. Rather, it was protected by ordinary property law, there being a dispute between her and her estranged husband over which of them had a legal right not only to custody of the child but also to possession of the chattels. Fuentes argues that Florida law allows her to defend on the ground that Firestone breached its obligations under the sales contract by failing to repair serious defects in the stove it sold her.
We need not consider this issue here. It is enough that the right to continued possession of the goods was open to some dispute at a hearing, since the sellers of the goods had to show, at the least, that the appellants had defaulted in their payments. The issues decisive of the ultimate right to continued possession, of course, may be quite simple.
The simplicity of the issues might be relevant to the formality or scheduling of a prior hearing. See Lindsey v. But it certainly cannot undercut the right to a prior hearing of some kind. It is not a rivulet of wage garnishment, but part of the mainstream of the past procedural due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Randone v. Of course, the primary issue in Goldberg was the form of hearing demanded by due process before termination of welfare benefits; the importance of welfare was directly relevant to that question.
The relative weight of liberty or property interests is relevant, of course, to the form of notice and hearing required by due process. See, e. But some form of notice and hearing -- formal or informal -- is required before deprivation of a property interest that "cannot be characterized as de minimis.
A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense, and it is often more efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right.
Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to be taken.
But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Stanley v. Of course, outright seizure of property is not the only kind of deprivation that must be preceded by a prior hearing. In three cases, the Court has allowed the attachment of property without a prior hearing. In one, the attachment was necessary to protect the public against the same sort of immediate harm involved in the seizure cases -- a bank failure.
Coffin Bros. Bennett, U. Another case involved attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court -- clearly a most basic and important public interest. Ownbey v. Morgan, U. It is much less clear what interests were involved in the third case, decided with an unexplicated per curiam opinion simply citing Coffin Bros. McKay v. McInnes, U. As far as essential procedural due process doctrine goes, McKay cannot stand for any more than was established in the Coffin Bros.
In cases involving deprivation of other interests, such as government employment, the Court similarly has required an unusually important governmental need to outweigh the right to a prior hearing. McElroy, U.
Seizure under a search warrant is quite a different matter, see n 30, infra. Phillips v. Commissioner, U. The Court stated that. The Court then relied on "the need of the government promptly to secure its revenues. Central Union Trust Co. Garvan, U. Wallace, U. Pfitsch, U. Fahey v. Mallonee, U. Ewing v. North American Storage Co. Chicago, U. By allowing repossession without an opportunity for a prior hearing, the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes may be intended specifically to reduce the costs for the private party seeking to seize goods in another party's possession.
Even if the private gain at stake in repossession actions were equal to the great public interests recognized in this Court's past decisions, see nn , supra, the Court has made clear that the avoidance of the ordinary costs imposed by the opportunity for a hearing is not sufficient to override the constitutional right.
See n 22, supra. The appellees argue that the cost of holding hearings may be especially onerous in the context of the creditor-debtor relationship. But the Court's holding in Sniadach v.
In any event, the aggregate cost of an opportunity to be heard before repossession should not be exaggerated. For we deal here only with the right to an opportunity to be heard. Since the issues and facts decisive of rights in repossession suits may very often be quite simple, there is a likelihood that many defendants would forgo their opportunity, sensing the futility of the exercise in the particular case.
And, of course, no hearing need be held unless the defendant, having received notice of his opportunity, takes advantage of it. The seizure of possessions under a writ of replevin is entirely different from the seizure of possessions under a search warrant.
First, a search warrant is generally issued to serve a highly important governmental need -- e. Second, a search warrant is generally issued in situations demanding prompt action. The danger is all too obvious that a criminal will destroy or hide evidence or fruits of his crime if given any prior notice.
Third, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that the State will not issue search warrants merely upon the conclusory application of a private party. It guarantees that the State will not abdicate control over the issuance of warrants and that no warrant will be issued without a prior showing of probable cause.
Thus, our decision today in no way implies that there must be opportunity for an adversary hearing before a search warrant is issued. But cf. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, U. See Brady v. United States, U. Zerbst, U. In the civil area, the Court has said that "[w]e do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights," Ohio Bell Tel.
Public Utilities Comm'n, U. Indeed, in the civil no less than the criminal area, "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Kennedy, U.
We do not reach the appellants' argument that the Florida and Pennsylvania statutory procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. See n 2, supra.
For once a prior hearing is required, at which the applicant for a writ must establish the probable validity of his claim for repossession, the Fourth Amendment problem may well be obviated. There is no need for us to decide that question at this point. Leeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing in preventing seizures of goods where the party seeking the writ has little probability of succeeding on the merits of the dispute.
Because the Court's opinion and judgment improvidently, in my view, call into question important aspects of the statutes of almost all the States governing secured transactions and the procedure for repossessing personal property, I must dissent for the reasons that follow. First: It is my view that, when the federal actions were filed in these cases and the respective District.
Courts proceeded to judgment, there were state court proceedings in progress. It seems apparent to me that the judgments should be vacated and the District Courts instructed to reconsider these cases in the light of the principles announced in Younger v. Mackell, U. Landry, U. Ledesma, U. For more than a year, Mrs. Fuentes made her installment payments.
Firestone instituted an action in a small-claims court for repossession of both the stove and the stereo, claiming that Mrs. Fuentes had refused to make her remaining payments. Florida and Pennsylvania statutes authorized the summary seizure of goods or chattels in a person's possession under a writ of replevin, and neither provided for notice or hearing prior to seizure.
Petitioners argued that the statutes deprived them of property in their possession in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. On review, the Supreme Court found that the statutes' prejudgment replevin provisions deprived petitioners of their property without due process insofar as they denied the right to prior notice and hearing before property was taken.
Are the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin provisions applied in this case invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment? The Florida and Pennsylvania replevin provisions are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment since they work a deprivation of property without due process of law by denying the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from the possessor. The right to a prior hearing has long been recognized under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.
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